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Abstract
We formulate a model of vertical differentiation to evaluate the welfare effects of removing
a low quality product from the market. The mechanism through which a welfare improvement
might arise is simple: Once the low quality low cost alternative is banned, entry into the high
quality segment becomes more likely. This in turn may lead to a significant reduction in the
price of the high quality product. We find that such a ban might improve aggregate welfare
when consumers value the higher quality more, the marginal cost of producing high quality is
lower, the price of low quality is higher, and the price sensitivity for high quality is not too
high.
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1 Introduction
On June 15, 1999 the European Commission passed a directive (the ‘ban’), requiring that egg
laying hen cages be phased out by 2012. According to the Directive, producers will have the
choice to go “free-range or to use “enriched” cages where stocking densities are lower and that
must have a nest, litter, perch and clawing board.1 The directive is mainly a result of the lobbying
efforts of animal welfare activists. Traditional cages increase the risk of disease, bone breakage and
mortality among as hens do not have sufficient space to engage in a minimal amount of physical
activities. European egg farmers, obviously, strongly oppose the directive. Several market studies
mention the high costs of converting exiting farms into those that comply with the directive as
well as the higher marginal costs of producing non-conventional eggs. Currently, 20% to 30% of
all eggs produced in Europe come from free-range farms, and they are priced significantly higher
than conventional eggs. Griffith and Nesheim (2008) find that household willingness to pay for
organic and free range products is heterogenous, but significantly positive for the majority. In
the foreground of all this is an intense public policy debate regarding the potential welfare costs
of the ban to Europe.
A similar policy change has occurred in California, U.S. recently. In the November 2008
elections Californians have voted overwhelmingly in favor of a ban on the use of conventional
cages in egg production.2 The California ban stirred up heated debates between animal rights
groups, industry members and the like. In fact, neighboring states like Idaho and Nevada are
actively trying to lure Californian egg farmers to their states.3 An economic impact study prepared
by Sumner et al. (2008) predicts that the egg production in California will be eliminated until
2015, the date when the ban becomes effective.
Although such bans would definitely improve animal welfare in Europe and the U.S., they will
lead to several changes that might have opposing effects on consumer welfare. On the one hand,
under the assumption that conventional and non-conventional eggs are substitutes, the removal
of a substitute good from the market is likely to increase the price of non-conventional eggs. On
the other hand, as more traditional farms convert to non-conventional egg production and supply
increases, there will be a downward pressure on the price. It is conceivable that the second effect
1See Appelby (2003) for a historic account of the events that led to the ban in 1999.
2The official title of measure was Proposition 2, or the Standards for Confining Farm Animals, and it passed
with a % 63.5 percent of the votes.
3A detailed account of the California ban can be found at http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/
California_Proposition_2_(2008).
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dominates the first one, such that the market price of non-conventional eggs decreases. Although
a reduction in the price of non-conventional eggs does not guarantee an increase in consumer
welfare, it is a necessary condition that, under certain conditions and combined with an overall
higher willingness to pay for non-conventional eggs, could lead to such a change. Nevertheless, the
impact on egg producers in areas affected by the ban is likely to be negative. For example, Sumner
et al. (2008) predict most of production for the California market to shift to the neighboring
states which have not imposed such restrictions while they do not predict significant investment
in California in facilities that satisfy the restrictions imposed by the ban. It is likely then that
the ban will have an impact on the organization of egg production.
The motivation for such measures both in Europe and US is based on moral grounds, and these
measures are strongly supported by animal welfare groups. In both cases, the industry opposes
the ban vehemently, producing reports with predictions which barely fall short of qualifying for
doomsday scenarios. They commonly predict loss of jobs and loss of production facilities to
areas without restrictions. Given the lack of economic justification for the bans, and predicted
reorganization of industries that would negatively impact the states which enact such policies, it
is curious whether such policies, which ban certain production technologies in favor of more costly
ones, can ever be a wise policy option. An important caveat to note here is the higher willingness
to pay of consumers for eggs produced by non-conventional methods, as reported by Griffith and
Nesheim (2008). This suggests a perceived quality difference between eggs produced by means of
conventional eggs and those produced by more humane ways envisioned by the ban policies.
Framed in this context, it is clear that the question is more general than the ban on certain egg
production technologies in favor of others. The question is whether the diffusion or consumption
of a new, more expensive, yet higher quality product can be encouraged by banning the production
of its lower quality lower cost alternative. Furthermore, the follow up question is whether such
a policy move could ever prove desirable from the perspective of consumers and the society at
large.
More concretely, we ask the following question in this paper: In a vertically differentiated
market where the low quality product is widely available and the high quality product has a
limited supply, could the removal of the low quality product increase welfare as it encourages
entry into the high quality segment of the market? As can be seen from our research question,
we do have a mechanism in mind on how a welfare improvement might arise. The idea is simple:
Once the low quality low cost alternative is banned, entry into the high quality segment becomes
more likely. As a result of entry, the price of the high quality good is likely to fall. If this decline
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in the price is sufficiently large, it might yield a significant increase in consumer surplus so much
so that it offsets the additional entry costs that firms need to incur, resulting in an overall increase
in welfare. Whether this mechanism works, and under what conditions it might work however is
not obvious.
In principle, this phenomenon could be relevant in any type of industry with vertical product
differentiation or with a steady rate of technological innovation, such as the software industry. It is
of great economic importance to identify the economic factors that lead to an inefficient adoption
of a higher quality (more generally, a higher valued) product. In this respect, the problem is
similar to the phenomenon of ‘excess inertia’, which is relevant in network industries. However,
we abstract from this effect as we try to show that even in the absence of network effects a market
may be dominated by a lower value product for too long, or maybe indefinitely.
In order the address the question we raised above, we develop a model of vertical differentia-
tion.4 Consumers have a perceived valuation of both high and low quality products. Conditional
on their valuations, each consumer has a log-linear demand function for the high and low quality
products as a function of their prices. Consumers perceive all high quality variants as homogenous.
The same holds true for all low quality variants. Consumers, however, differ in their respective
valuations. Each consumer draws a bivariate vector of valuations from a modified bivariate ex-
ponential distribution taking into account the condition that the high quality valuation is higher
than that of the low quality. Were both products to be sold at the same price, all consumers
would obviously prefer the high quality product. When prices differ however, those consumer who
value the high quality significantly more opt for the high quality product, while others prefer to
purchase the low quality product.
We first derive an aggregate demand function for the high quality product when it competes
with a low quality alternative that is supplied by a competitive fringe. We then implement the ban
by setting the price of the low quality product to infinity, and derive the corresponding aggregate
demand for the high quality product after a ban. Both aggregate demand functions have the
same general exponential form. The effect of a ban on the aggregate demand for high quality is
two-fold. First demand elasticity decreases as result of the ban. Second, provided that the high
quality product’s price exceeds the price of the low quality alternative, the demand function for
the high quality product shifts outward as well. Both of these effects are likely to increase the
4We do not use the standard Shaked and Sutton (1982) model. Because of the inelastic unit demands in such
a model, regardless of the change in the price of the high quality good, the contribution to the aggregate welfare
from the consumers who purchase the high quality product before and after a ban is zero when production takes
place using a constant returns to scale technology.
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profitability of the high quality product.
We then move to the analysis of competition between firms in the high quality segment. Given
the homogeneity of products in the high quality segment, we adopt a Cournot model to study
the competition between firms. We assume that the high quality variants can be produced with
a constant returns to scale technology, however, a firm who wishes to produce needs to incur a
fixed cost of entry. Given the exponential nature of the aggregate demand function both before
and after a ban, the equilibrium prices have a similar form, and are independent of the price of
the low quality alternative, while they depend on the inherent price sensitivity of demand, the
average perceived quality differential as well as the number of active firms. Our results indicate
that as long as the number of active firms that produce the high quality product becomes larger
than it was before the ban, and the average perceived quality differential are sufficiently high, the
price of the high quality product decreases as a result of the ban.
We next restrict our attention to a specific scenario in order to obtain relatively simple analyti-
cal results. We consider a situation where the high quality segment is served by a single firm before
the ban, while after the ban two firms serve the high quality segment in a free entry equilibrium.5
We first derive the conditions under which the ban results in an increase in aggregate consumer
surplus. We find that the average perceived quality differential has to be sufficiently high. This
alone is not sufficient however. In addition, either the inherent price sensitivity of consumers
has to be sufficiently low and/or the marginal cost of producing the high quality should not be
too different from the price of the low quality alternative for the ban to lead to an increase in
consumer surplus. The region of parameters where the ban yields an increase in aggregate welfare
has similar properties, but is naturally smaller. The main reason for this is the requirement that
the consumer surplus increase substantially in order to offset the loss of monopoly profits earned
by the monopolist prior to a ban. Nevertheless, we find that there exists a nonnegligible region
in the feasible parameter space where banning a low quality alternative results in an increase in
aggregate welfare.
The next section introduces the basic model. In section 3, we investigate the welfare effects
of a ban. Section 4 concludes.
5As the number of active firms before a ban increases, the difference between the before and after ban prices
erodes, hence it becomes unlikely that a ban would produce consumer benefits. However, we also disregard the
possibility that more than two firms supply the high quality after the ban. In such a case, the price of the high
quality product would be more likely to fall.
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2 Model
2.1 Demand
Consider a market with a continuum of consumers. Consumers choose among two products: a
vertically differentiated good and the numeraire good. Suppose that the utility of a consumer is
given by the following quasilinear utility function
u(x, y; s) =
x(δ + s+ 1)− x ln(x)
β
+ y
where s > 0 denotes the quality and x denotes the quantity of the non-numeraire good being
consumed, y is the quantity of the numeraire good, and δ > 0 and β > 0 are common taste
parameters. Individual utility maximization with respect to a budget constraint leads to the
following demand function for the non-numeraire good
d(p, s) = exp(δ + s− βp) (1)
and a corresponding indirect utility function of
V (p, s) =
exp(δ + s− βp)
β
. (2)
We assume that there are two possible variants of this product and that consumers choose
only one of the two quality variants. This framework is in line with the motivation we have put
forward in the introduction; consumers choosing between a generic, low quality product and a
newer, more advanced, higher quality product. Even though consumers are heterogenous with
respect to their valuations of the two variants, they all value the higher quality product more.
In this respect, there is a typical vertical differentiation between the two variants of the same
product. However. unlike the standard model due to Shaked and Sutton (1982), our framework
allows for elastic individual demands.
Let us label the two variants as H for “High Quality” and L for “Low Quality”. Consumer
heterogeneity in tastes for quality will come from the differences in the parameters sH and sL.
We assume each consumer draws a bivariate vector of tastes for quality from the joint density
function
f(sH , sL) =


(λH+λL)
λ2HλL
e
−
sH
λH e
−
sL
λL sH > sL > 0,
0 otherwise
(3)
with 0 ≤ λH < 1 and 0 ≤ λL < 1. The restrictions on λH and λL are required for the integrability
of individual demands over the population that comes into play during the derivation of aggregate
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demands. Note that the draws of an individual are not independent. If a consumer draws a high
sL, her draw for sH must be even higher. Alternatively, if the realization for the taste for high
quality is low, the realization of the low quality taste must be even lower. Thus, each consumer’s
tastes for quality are positively correlated.6 We assume however that the draws of different
consumer are independent of one another. Of the two density parameters, λH plays an important
role. Given the bivariate density function in (3), it turns out that λH = E(sH − sL), i.e. it
measures the average (expected) quality difference between the high and low quality variants.
Essentially when both qualities are sold at the same price, all consumers are going to prefer
the high quality variant. In other words
V (p, sH) > V (p, sL) for all p.
This implies that there will be positive sales for the lower quality variant only when the higher
quality variant is priced higher. In order to calculate the proportion of consumers who choose the
high quality variant, one needs to find the region on the domain of the bivariate random vector
[sH , sL] such that
V (pH , sH) ≥ V (pL, sL).
Given the indirect utility function in (2), the set of consumers who choose to buy the high quality
variant is given by the region
sH ≥ sL + β(pH − pL).
And the set of consumer who choose to buy the low quality variant will then be given by
sL ≤ sH < sL + β(pH − pL).
The demand functions for the two quality variants can then be obtained by calculating the
expected value of the demand in (1) over the corresponding regions of [sH , sL]. Formally,
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dCH(pH , pL) =
∫ ∞
sL=0
∫ ∞
sH=sL+β(pH−pL)
d(p, sH)f(sH , sL)dsHdsL
=
(λH + λL)
(λH + λL − λHλL)(1− λH)e
{δ−βpL−
β(pH−pL)
λH
}
= eA
C−αCpH .
6The correlation coefficient between the two elements of the bivariate vector is given by ρ = λL√
(λH+λL)
2+λ2
L
.
7The demand for the low quality product can be computed similarly as
d
C
L (pH , pL) =
∫ ∞
sL=0
∫ sL+β(pH−pL)
sH=sL
d(p, sL)f(sH , sL)dsHdsL
=
(λH + λL)
(λH + λL − λHλL)(1− λH)e
δ−βpL(1− e−
β(pH−pL)
λH ).
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where AC = δ − βpL(1− 1λH ) + ln(
λH+λL
(λH+λL−λHλL)(1−λH )
), and αC = βλH .
Now, consider the case where the low quality variant is removed from the market. This ‘ban’
is basically equivalent to setting the price of the low quality variant to infinity. In this case, all
consumer purchase only the high quality product as long as its price is finite. The demand for
the high quality variant becomes much easier to compute, as consumers do no longer have the
option of choosing the low quality alternative. The demand function for high quality after the
ban is given by
dBH(pH) =
∫ ∞
sL=0
∫ ∞
sH=sL
d(p, sH)f(sH , sL)dsHdsL
=
(λH + λL)
(λH + λL − λHλL)(1− λH)e
{δ−βpH}
= eA
B−αBpH .
where AB = δ + ln( λH+λL(λH+λL−λHλL)(1−λH )), and α
B = β.
At this stage, we can make a few observations regarding the effects of a ban on the aggregate
demand for the high quality alternative. The ‘ban’ clearly lowers the flexibility of consumers
regarding their consumption choices, as they can no longer opt for the low quality alternative.
First, consider the effect of the ban on the price elasticity of aggregate demand. The price elasticity
of demand, in absolute value, before the ban is given by βpHλH , while after the ban it is given by
βpH . Since λH < 1 by assumption, demand becomes less elastic after the ban. This fact plays an
important role in the pricing decisions of the firms that produce the high quality variant. Next
compare the demand for the high quality product before and after the ban for the same price pH .
Namely,
dBH(pH)− dCH(pH , pL) = dBH(pH)(1− e{−
β(1−λH)
λH
(pH−pL)})
which is positive as long as pH > pL and λH < 1. At prices that exceed the price of the low
quality alternative, the demand for the high quality product after the ban is always higher. In
summary, after the ban, the aggregate demand for the high quality product increases and becomes
less elastic. Both changes are likely to increase the profitability of the high quality segment. This
is exactly the reason why we expect a greater number of firms to be active after a ban.
2.2 Supply and Market Equilibrium
The two quality segments of the market are served by separate firms. We assume that the low
quality variant is supplied by a competitive fringe at an equilibrium price of pL. The firms that
produce the high quality variant compete in quantities, ‘a la Cournot’. They have identical
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production technologies with a constant marginal cost equal to k. In addition, high quality firms
have to incur a one-time fixed entry cost of F . One can think of the additional fixed cost of
producing the high quality variant as the cost of converting or upgrading to that technology of
production.8
Given the similar shape of the aggregate demand functions for the high quality before and after
the ban, we will derive equilibrium prices and quantities for a generic demand with parameters A
and α, where A ∈ {AC , AB} and α ∈ {αC , αB}. Assuming that there are N active firms in the
high quality segment, and all firms but firm i producing symmetric quantities of q, one can write
the inverse demand as
pH =
A− ln(qi + (N − 1)q)
α
.
Consequently, the profit function of firm i is then given by
pii =
[
A− ln(qi + (N − 1)q)
α
− k
]
qi.
Solving for the symmetric Cournot equilibrium, the equilibrium quantities and the equilibrium
price for the high quality variant become
q∗(A,α,N) =
eA−kα−1/N
N
and
p∗(A,α,N) = k +
1
Nα
.
Note that the equilibrium price does not depend on A but it depends on α. As a consequence,
while the equilibrium prices will be affected by the change in the demand elasticities before and
after the ban, they are unaffected by the price of the low quality alternative. This is due to the
stylized model of demand we adopt. On the other hand, the equilibrium production of the high
quality product increases with the price of the low quality product before the ban. When the
price of the low quality product is low, the high quality product is consumed by a small niche of
consumers which has substantially higher valuations of its quality.
Subsequently, per firm equilibrium profits are given by
pi∗(A,α,N) =
eA−kα−1/N
N2α
− F
where naturally ∂pi
∗(A,α,N)
∂N < 0, i.e. profits decrease with the number of active firms with or
without a ban.9
8For instance, converting conventional egg farms to free-range farms involves a one-time fixed cost. As stated
in the introduction, empirical evidence also predicts higher variable or marginal costs of production for the higher
quality product. Our model will capture this if k > pL.
9 ∂pi
∗(A,α,N)
∂N
= − (2N−1) exp(A−kα−1/N)
N4α
< 0 for N ≥ 1.
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Furthermore, when the number of active firms serving the high quality segment remains the
same, those who operate in a market where the low quality product is banned earn higher profits.
Lemma 1 Per firm profits after the ban are higher than per firm profits before the ban: pi∗(AB , αB , N) >
pi∗(AC , αC , N).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 implies that in free entry equilibrium, we would expect to see more active firms in
a market after the ban. A special case of interest occurs when there are only two active firms.
There is a range of values for the fixed cost parameter F such that a second firm does not find it
profitable to enter the high quality segment unless the low quality is removed from the market.
Consequently, for a certain range of fixed costs we have pi∗(AB , αB , 2) > 0 > pi∗(AC , αC , 2). For
much of the following welfare analysis we will assume this to be the case.
Before starting our analysis of the effects of a ban on consumer surplus and welfare, we
establish a simple result regarding the change in the price of the high quality variant as a result
of the ban. Lemma 1 suggests that more firms will be active in the high quality segment after
the institution of a ban. Let N denote the number of firms active before the ban and let N +M
firms be active after the ban.
Proposition 1 The price of the high quality product is lower after a ban whenever λH is greater
than the ratio of the pre- to after ban number of firms that supply high quality. That is, ∆pH =
p∗H(A
C , αC , N)−p∗H(AB , αB , N+M) > 0 whenever λH > NN+M . For such values of λH , however,
∆pH decreases with the number of active firms prior to a ban N .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The implication of Proposition 1 is that whenever there are sufficiently many active firms
serving the high quality segment prior to a ban, the likely impact of a ban of the low quality
product would be to reduce prices, albeit not drastically. Thus, if we wish to find situations where
a ban would improve consumer surplus—a prerequisite for improving welfare—, those instances
where a relatively small number of firms serve the high quality segment prior to a ban would be
good candidates. Henceforth, we will restrict our attention to a situation where only a monopoly
firm is active prior to a ban, and two firms are active after the ban.
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3 Welfare Impact of the Ban
3.1 Consumer Welfare
It is clear that, in the event of the removal of the low quality variant from the market, any
increase in consumer surplus may only result from a significant lowering of the price of the high
quality variant. Consumers with draws of sH very close to sL, would be worse off due to a ban as
long as the price of the high quality product is above the price offered by the competitive fringe
for the low quality product. In order to offset this loss in surplus, those consumers with higher
realizations of sH must become significantly better off as a result of the ban. Since the demand
for the high quality becomes less elastic after the ban, this is only possible if the supply of high
quality increases through the entry of new firms.10
We will first derive the consumer surplus for a generic number of firms in the two subcases: with
and without the low quality variant in the market. Obviously, a decrease in prices as demonstrated
in proposition 1 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for consumer surplus to increase. When
consumers have the option to buy either variant, their surplus becomes the sum of indirect utilities
from consuming either quality. Namely, consumer surplus before the ban is
CSC(pH , pL) =
∫ ∞
sL=0
∫ ∞
sH=sL+β(pH−pL)
V (pH , sH)f(sH , sL)dsHdsL
+
∫ ∞
sL=0
∫ sL+β(pH−pL)
sH=sL
V (pL, sL)f(sH , sL)dsHdsL
=
(λH + λL)
(
eδ−βpL(1− λH + λHe
βpL−βpH
λH )
)
(λH + λL − λHλL)(1 − λH)β
whereas after the ban surplus consists of only the sum of indirect utilities from the consumption
of the high quality variant, and depends only on the price of the high quality
CSB(pH) =
∫ ∞
sL=0
∫ ∞
sH=sL
V (pH , sH)f(sH , sL)dsHdsL
=
(λH + λL)e
δ−βpH
(λH + λL − λHλL)(1− λH)β .
The removal of the low quality variant changes the market outcome in two different ways.
On the one hand, as the demand for the high quality variant becomes less elastic, there is an
upward pressure on its price. Moreover, the removal of a substitute product raises the demand
for the high quality product. Both of these effects increase the profits of an active firm in the high
10When the equilibrium number of firms remains the same after the ban, the price of the of the high quality
variant changes by 1−λH
Nβ
> 0.
11
quality segment. As a result, new firms will be induced to enter the market, and this will put
a downward pressure on the equilibrium price. The net effect on the equilibrium price depends
on the magnitudes of these two effects. As stated earlier, one also needs to take into account the
welfare loss of the consumers who after the ban have to switch to their less preferred product.
The highly parametric nature of the demand model makes it difficult to establish concrete results
on the net change in consumer surplus. Besides, as we have already shown in proposition 1, when
sufficiently many firms are active prior to a ban, the likelihood of an increase in consumer surplus
and welfare following the ban decreases. To this effect, we concentrate on a pre-ban monopolistic
high quality segment. We will then identify the parameter regions where without a ban additional
entry does not occur, but where the ban leads to 1) the entry of at least one additional firm into
the high quality segment, and 2) an improvement in consumer and aggregate welfare.
Substituting in the equilibrium price of the high quality product where N = 1 firms are active
before the ban and N = 2 firms are active after the ban, the expressions for consumer surplus
become
CSC(1, pL) =
(λH + λL)
(
eδ−βpL
(
1− λH + λHe
βpL−βk
λH
−1
))
(λHλL − λH − λL)(λH − 1)β
and
CSB(2) =
(λH + λL)e
δ−βk− 1
2
(λHλL − λH − λL)(λH − 1)β
Under the scenario in consideration, the ratio of consumer surpluses is equal to
CSC(1)
CSB(2)
= eβ(k−pL)+
1
2
(
1− λH + λHe−1−
β(k−pL)
λH
)
.
Note that the ratio of consumer surpluses depends only on four parameters: λH , β, k, and pL.
Furthermore, the last three of those parameters enter the ratio in a single term: β(k − pL).This
suggests that we can conduct our welfare analysis on a two-dimensional parameter space. Denote
z ≡ β(k − pL).11 Then we have
CSC(1)
CSB(2)
= ez+
1
2
(
1− λH + λHe−1−
z
λH
)
.
We show in the appendix that, this ratio of consumer surpluses is monotonically decreasing
in λH for λH ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, for all values of z, CS
C(1)
CSB(2)
is greater than 1 at λH = 0 and it
is less than 1 at λH = 1. These findings are brought together in the following proposition.
11It turns out that z is a convenient function of these three parameters. Changes in z have a very clear inter-
pretation in terms of the changes in these parameters. The value of z decreases as the marginal cost of producing
the high quality variant approaches the price of the low quality variant and/or as the price elasticity of the high
quality decreases.
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Proposition 2 There is a value λ˜H(z) ∈ (0, 1), such that for all λH > λ˜H(z), we have CS
C(1)
CSB(2)
<
1. Thus, as a result of the ban, consumer surplus will rise if λH is sufficiently large.
Proof. See the above discussion for the intuition behind the result and the appendix for the
derivations.
It is interesting to further investigate how the critical value of the average quality difference,
λ˜H(z), depends on the value of z—and consequently on the remaining parameters of the model.
For example, at z = 0, which occurs when pL = k, the critical value becomes λ˜H = 0.62. This
implies that for all λH ∈ (0.62, 1], the ratio of consumer surpluses is going to be less than 1 and
the ban improves consumer welfare. For values of z > 0, the behavior of λ˜H(z) is not immediately
clear. Hence, we first identify the link between z and λ˜H(z) by taking the total derivative of
CSC(1)
CSB(2)
= 1 to compute dλHdz as:
dλ˜H(z)
dz
=
λH(z)(1 − λH(z))
(
1− e−
z
λH (z)
−1
)
λH − (λH(z) + z)e−
z
λH (Z)
−1
which is positive for all z and for all λH .
12 The implication is that the critical value λ˜H(z)
increases in z. Since z simply equals β(k − pL), we have the obvious result that an increase
in the marginal cost of production of high quality suppliers will restrict the parameter region
where consumer surplus rises after the ban. The next proposition summarizes the effects of the
parameters β, pL, and k on the ratio of consumer surpluses.
Proposition 3 An increase in k raises, and an increase in pL lowers the critical value λ˜H , where
for all λH > λ˜H(z) consumer surplus rises after the ban. The effect of an increase in β on λ˜H(z)
is positive whenever k > pL.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 describes the mechanism underlying the change in consumer surplus after the
ban. As the production of the high quality variant becomes more costly, as the demand for high
quality becomes more inelastic when the price of the high quality variant exceeds that of the low
quality, and as the price of the low quality variant is lower, the possibility of the ban leading to
an increase in consumer surplus diminishes. In other words, as the price differential between the
two qualities is increasingly in favor of the low quality variant, the ban becomes more costly to
the consumers.
12See the Appendix for the proof.
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In sum, there is a range of the parameters of the model where the removal of the low quality
variant from the market leads to a strict increase in consumer welfare as measured by the aggregate
consumer surplus. Figure 1 presents λ˜H(z) as a function of z > 0. In the diagonally shaded and
crosshatched regions, aggregate consumer surplus increases. As can be seen the most likely cases
where a ban results in an improvement in aggregate consumer surplus involves higher values of
the average quality difference, lower values of price sensitivity of individual demand and/or a
small difference between the marginal cost of producing the high quality product and the price
of the fringe.
It should also be noted that the ban does not lead to a Pareto improvement of consumer
welfare. In other words, the distribution of consumer surplus changes as some consumers become
better-off and some become worse-off. At this point we are only stating results regarding aggregate
consumer welfare. Especially those consumers who do not view the two alternatives as being too
different in terms of quality will suffer as a result of the ban.
Next, we will state our results regarding aggregate welfare, which also includes firm profits.
3.2 Aggregate Welfare
Let us consider the aggregate welfare effects of the ban on low quality. Our definition of aggregate
welfare is a simple sum of consumer surplus and firm profits. Equilibrium firm profits, pi∗(A,α,N),
for a generic number of firms was given in Section 2.2. Again, we have to consider the before and
after ban cases separately. Before the ban, the profit of a monopolist is given by
pi∗(AC , αC , 1) =
(λH + λL)λHe
δ−βk−1
(λH + λL − λHλL)(1− λH)β − F
and the after ban profit of a duopolist is simply
pi∗(AB , αB , 2) =
1
4
(λH + λL)e
δ−βk− 1
2
(λH + λL − λHλL)(1 − λH)β − F .
For simplicity of the calculations let us equate the fixed cost of production to the maximum
value that will sustain two firms after the ban. Namely, set F = Fmax such that pi∗(AB , αB , 2) = 0.
Note that this is the most ‘conservative’ scenario. For all smaller values ofF , the duopolists will
be making positive profits which would then be added to the after ban measure of welfare.13 We
are in essence providing a lower boundary on the welfare increase following the ban.
13When F is lower than this maximum value, the pre-ban monopolist’s profit would also increase. However, since
there are two active firms after the ban, their total gain in profits will be the double of that of the monopolist.
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Figure 1: Regions where consumer surplus and welfare improve
Adding the profit terms to the consumer surplus expressions we have calculated earlier, we
obtain our measure of aggregate welfare. Our interest essentially lies in the change in this measure
which is given by
∆W = CSB(2)− CSC(1, pL)− pi∗(AC , αC , 1)|F=Fmax .
It turns out that the sign of ∆W depends on the same set of parameters that determine the
consumer surplus ratio: λH , β, k, and pL. Furthermore, once again, the last three of those
parameters enter the welfare difference as a single term: z ≡ β(k−pL). The following proposition
proves the existence of a welfare improving ban.
Proposition 4 There is a value λˆH(z) ∈ (0, 1), such that for all λH > λˆH(z) and z > 0 we have
∆W > 0. Therefore, following a ban of the low quality alternative, aggregate welfare will rise if
λH is sufficiently large.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The idea behind Proposition 4 is very similar to that behind Proposition 2. Welfare after the
ban as well as the welfare difference, ∆W , increase in the average quality difference λH . There
is a critical level of average quality difference, λˆH(z), such that when λH exceeds this threshold,
consumers on average value the high quality so much more than the low quality alternative. this
in turn lowers the price of the high quality product after additional entry so substantially that
the increase in aggregate consumer surplus offsets the loss of monopoly profits before ban. And,
in turn, aggregate welfare increases.
Next, let us consider how this critical level, λˆH(z), depends on the value of z. From the
previous discussion on the change in consumer surplus, it is clear that as the marginal cost of
producing high quality rises or as the price of the price of the low quality falls, it becomes less
likely that the ban improves welfare. Since both of these changes imply an increase in z, we would
expect the critical level λˆH(z) to increase in z. Formally, one needs to take the total derivative
of ∆W = 0 and solve it for dλH (z)dz . Evaluating this expression at λH = λˆH gives us the desired
result which is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 The critical level of the average quality difference parameter increases in z:
dλˆH(z)
dz > 0. Furthermore, an increase in k raises, and an increase in pL lowers the critical value
λˆH , where for all λH > λˆH(z) aggregate welfare rises after the ban. The effect of an increase in
β on λˆH(z) is positive if k > pL.
Proof. See the above discussion and the Appendix.
The effects of all four parameters on the welfare difference function have clear interpretations.
An increase in the marginal cost of production of high quality suppliers will restrict the parameter
region where aggregate welfare rises after the ban. This makes perfect sense: the higher the costs
of producing high quality, the higher the equilibrium price of it. An increase in the price of the low
quality substitute, on the other hand, makes the adverse impact of its removal from the market
less pronounced. Finally, as β increases both pre and after ban prices fall, however their difference
also decreases. This is due to the fact that an increase in β raises the price sensitivity of aggregate
demand faster before the ban. It follows that an increase in β lowers the possibility of a welfare
improvement.
In figure 1, the crosshatched area on the (λH , z) space corresponds to the region where an
increase in welfare is realized. It is clear that for all values of z, we have λˆH(z) > λ˜H(z). The
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region that corresponds to a welfare increase is unambiguously smaller than which corresponds to
an increase in consumer surplus. This is something to be expected. As stated earlier, we set the
fixed cost of production such that our duopolists make zero profits. As the lower quality product
is banned, the increase in consumer surplus is in part canceled by the loss of the pre-ban monopoly
profit. Nevertheless, the main result we would like to stress out is that there is a non-negligible
range of parameters over which the removal of the low quality variant can be welfare improving.
Additionally, one should note that the region in figure 1 is based on a conservative benchmark.
There are fixed costs of entry below Fmax, for which entry into the high quality segment by two
firms without the removal of the low quality alternative is not profitable. On all these cases, while
one duopolist’s profit is offset by the loss of monopoly profit when the ban is not implemented,
the other duopolist’s profit enters as a positive contributitor to the aggregate welfare calculation.
4 Conclusion
Recent regulations in agricultural and animal products markets that disallow a certain subgroup
of products resulted in a heated public policy debate. With the help of a theoretical model, we
elaborate on this discussion by considering the welfare effects of such a ‘ban’. More concretely, we
ask if the removal of the low quality product could increase welfare in a vertically differentiated
market as it encourages entry into the high quality segment. The mechanism through which a
welfare improvement might arise is simple: Once the low quality low cost alternative is banned,
entry into the high quality segment becomes more likely. Entry puts a downward pressure on the
price of the high quality product. If this decline in the price is sufficiently large, it will yield an
increase in consumer surplus which might offset the additional entry costs the new firms need to
incur. As a consequence, the resulting change in aggregate welfare can be positive.
In order the address this question, we develop a model of vertical differentiation. Consumers
have heterogenous tastes for high and low quality. We first derive an aggregate demand function
for the high quality product when it competes with a low quality product that is supplied by a
competitive fringe. We then implement the ban by setting the price of the low quality product
to infinity, and derive the corresponding aggregate demand for the high quality product after a
ban. The effect of a ban on the aggregate demand for high quality is two-fold. First, demand
elasticity decreases as a result of the ban. Second, provided that the price of the high quality
product exceeds the price of the low quality alternative, the demand function for the high quality
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product shifts outwards. Both of these effects are likely to increase the profitability of the high
quality product.
We then move on to the analysis of competition between firms in the high quality segment.
We model the supply of high quality a la Cournot. We assume that the high quality variant can
be produced with a constant returns to scale technology; however, a firm who wishes to produce
needs to incur a fixed cost of entry. Our results indicate that as long as the number of active firms
that produce the high quality product increases, and the average difference of the valuations of
quality is sufficiently high, the price of the high quality product decreases as a result of the ban.
In order to obtain relatively simple analytical results regarding the change in consumer and
aggregate welfare, we restrict our attention to a specific scenario. We consider a situation where
the high quality segment is served by a monopolist before the ban, and by a pair of duopolists
afterwards. We first derive the conditions under which the ban results in an increase in consumer
surplus and find that the difference of quality valuations has to be sufficiently high, but this
condition alone is not sufficient. Additionally, for the ban to lead to an increase in consumer
surplus, either the inherent price sensitivity of consumers has to be sufficiently low and/or the
marginal cost of producing the high quality should not be too different from the price of the
low quality alternative. The region of parameters where the ban yields an increase in aggregate
welfare is smaller. The main reason for this is the requirement that consumer surplus increase
substantially in order to offset the loss of monopoly profits earned by the monopolist prior to a
ban. Overall, we find that there exists a nonnegligible region in the permissible parameter space
where banning a low quality alternative results in an increase in aggregate welfare.
In principle, this phenomenon could be relevant in any type of industry with vertical product
differentiation or with a steady rate of technological innovation. It is of great economic importance
to identify the economic factors that lead to an inefficient adoption of a higher quality (more
generally, a higher valued) product. Even though we are unable to provide exact analytical
results that pertain to the general case with any number of firms before the ban, we demonstrate
the possibility of a persistent market failure under vertical product differentiation. Another step
forward would be to generalize the production technologies of the low quality and high quality
firms to allow for non-constant returns to scale. When there are diminishing returns to scale
in the production of the low quality firm, there can be an added factor of efficiency gains from
banning the low quality.
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Appendix
A–1 Proof of Lemma 1
The difference between pre and after ban profit functions for an equal number of firms is given by
pi∗(AB , αB , N)− pi∗(AC , αC , N) = e
AB−kαB−1/N
N2αB
− e
AC−kαC−1/N
N2αC
=
eδ(λH + λL)
(
e
βk
(
1−λH
λH
)
− λHeβpL
(
1−λH
λH
))
N2βe
βk
λH
+N
(λHλL − λH − λL)(λH − 1)
The denominator and the first two terms on the numerator are clearly positive. For k > pL
the term inside the parentheses is also positive since λH < 1.
A–2 Proof of Proposition 1
Denoting the number of firms before the ban by N and that after the ban by N +M , the price
change can be computed as
∆pH(N,M) = p
∗
H(A
C , αC , N)− p∗H(AB , αB , N +M) =
λH(N +M)−N
βN(N +M)
.
The sign of this term is positive when N < λH(N +M).
Next, consider change in the price differential as the number of active firms prior to the ban
increases. Namely,
∂∆pH(N,M)
∂N
= −λH(N +M)
2 −N2
βN2(N +M)2
which clearly is negative whenever NN+M <
√
λH . Thus, as N increases the price differential
before and after the ban becomes smaller.
A–3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let γ(z, λH) denote the ratio of CS
C(1, pL) and CS
B(2), which is given by
γ(z, λH) =
CSC(1)
CSB(2)
= ez+
1
2
(
1− λH + λHe−1−
z
λH
)
> 0.
It is easy to verify that the derivative of γ(z, λH) with respect to λH is given by
∂
∂λH
γ(z, λH) = −ez+
1
2
[
1− ψe−ψ
]
with ψ = 1 + zλH . It is also easy to verify that ψe
−ψ is log-concave, and hence has a unique
maximum at ψ = 1. Thus, the smallest value of the term in the brackets is obtained at ψ = 1
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and is given by 0.632. Since ez+
1
2 > 0 for all z, we have that ∂∂λH γ(z, λH) < 0. Thus, γ(z, λH ) is
decreasing in λH ∈ [0, 1).
Note that γ(z, 0) = e(z + 12) > 1 and γ(z, 1) = e
− 1
2 < 1. There exists a λ˜H(z) which
solves γ(z, λ˜H(z)) = 1. Furthermore, for all λH > λ˜H(z), we have γ(z, λH) < 1 and hence
CSB(2) > CSC(1, pL).
A–4 Proof of Proposition 3
We can compute ∂∂z λ˜(z) by differentiating γ(z, λ˜(z)) = 1 with respect to z and solving for
∂
∂z λ˜(z)
which is given by
∂
∂z
λ˜(z) =
(1− λH)(1− e−ψ)
1− ψe−ψ
with ψ = 1 +´ zλH . We have shown earlier that 1 − ψe−ψ > 0 for all ψ. The numerator has the
same sign as 1−e−ψ which is positive whenever ψ > 0, or equivalently as long as z > −λH . Thus,
λ˜H(z) increases with z as long as 0 ≤ λH < 1 and z > −λH .
The rest of the claims in the proposition follows by straightforward differentiation. We know
that dλ˜Hdz > 0. Since by definition
dz
dk > 0, and
dz
dpL
< 0, by the chain rule we have dλ˜Hdk > 0, and
dλ˜H
dpL
< 0. > 0. Finally, dzdβ = k − pL. Therefore, dλ˜Hdβ > 0 for k > pL, dλ˜Hdβ < 0 for k < pL and
dλ˜H
dβ = 0 otherwise.
A–5 Proof of Proposition 4
Comparison of before and after ban welfare is a complicated issue. Given that what we want to
do is to highlight the possibility of having a duopoly after the ban, and a monopoly before the
ban, we will set the fixed entry cost so that the total industry profit is zero after the ban. This
is the least likely case that would result in a welfare gain.
Note that the after ban equilibrium profit when two firms enter is given by
pi(AB , αB , 2) =
1
4β
λH(λH + λL)
(1− λH)(λH + λL − λHλL)e
δ−βk− 1
2 − F
Thus, the critical fixed cost which allows two firms to enter is simply given by the zero profit
condition as
Fmax =
1
4β
λH(λH + λL)
(1− λH)(λH + λL − λHλL)e
δ−βk− 1
2 .
In this case, the welfare after ban is simply equal to the consumer surplus. The welfare difference
before and after the ban is then
∆W = CSB(2)− CSC(1, pL)− pi∗(AC , αC , 1)|F=Fmax .
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It is straightforward though cumbersome to verify that ∆W = w0w1(z, λH ) where
w0 =
1
4β
(λH + λL)
(1− λH)(λH + λL − λHλL)e
δ−βpL
and
w1(z, λH) = 5e
−z− 1
2 − 4(1− λH)− 8λHe−
z
λH
−1
with z = β(k − pL). Given that w0 > 0 for all relevant parameter values, the sign of ∆W is the
same as the sign of w1(z, λH ).
First note that
∂w1(z, λH)
∂λH
= 4(1− 2ψe−ψ).
with ψ = 1+ zλH as defined above. Once again, since ψe
−ψ is logconcave, it is uniquely maximized
at ψ = 1. Therefore, ∂w1(z,λH)∂λH is minimized at ψ = 1, and min[4(1 − 2ψe−ψ)] ≈ 1.057 > 0.
Consequently, ∂w1(z,λH)∂λH >, for all λH and z.
We have w1(z, 0) = 5e
−z− 1
2 − 4 < 0 for all z > 0. On the other hand, we have w1(z, 1) ≈
0.090e−z > 0. Therefore, there exists a λˆH(z), such that w1(z, λˆH(z)) = 0. For λH > λˆH(z), we
have w1(z, λH) > 0 and therefore ∆W > 0 whenever λH > λˆH(z).
A–6 Proof of Proposition 5
Totally differentiating w1(z, λH) = 0 we obtain
dλˆH(z)
dz
= −
∂w1(z,λH)
∂z
∂w1(z,λH)
∂λH
|λH=λˆH(z).
Since we have shown earlier that ∂w1(z,λH)∂λH > 0,
sign(
dλˆH(z)
dz
) = sign(−∂w1(z, λH)
∂z
)|λH=λˆH(z)
Straightforward differentiation yields
∂w1(z, λH)
∂z
|λH=λˆH(z) = 5e
−z− 1
2 − 8e−(1+
z
λˆH (z)
)
= −w1(z, λˆH(z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+5e−z−
1
2 − 8e−(1+
z
λˆH (z)
)
= 4(1 − λˆH(z))(1 − 2e−1e−
z
λˆH (z) )
> 4(1 − λˆH(z))(1 − 0.735e−
z
λˆH (z) ) > 0
whenever z > 0. Therefore, we have dλˆH(z)dz > 0.
The remaining claims follow by a straightforward application of the chain rule.
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